By Gevorg Ghukasyan, PhD in Political Sciences
Special Project Manager at Armenian National Committee – International
On August 8, 2025, facilitated by U.S. mediation in Washington, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a pre-agreement on a “Treaty on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations Between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia.” The parties had previously announced on March 13, 2025 that negotiations on the text of this peace treaty had been concluded. On that occasion, the Azerbaijani foreign minister—disregarding Yerevan’s proposal for a joint communique and violating diplomatic reciprocity—declared that Armenia had accepted Azerbaijan’s proposals concerning two unresolved clauses. These proposals involved mutual withdrawal of international legal claims and a prohibition on deploying third-country forces on their border.
The pre-agreement, which currently lacks legal effect until it undergoes requisite domestic ratification, comprises 17 articles. By its nature, the agreement is more about establishing interstate relations than about guaranteeing peace, since it fails to address explicitly any of the circumstances that might destabilize peace in the region.
In our previous article in this series, we observed that in the current state of affairs, uncertainty prevails over clarity, and we flagged several points in the pre-agreement and its accompanying memoranda that deserve careful scrutiny. In this article, we turn to a more detailed analysis of those problematic areas.
1. The Agreement Sidesteps Fundamental Preconditions for Genuine Peace
a. Realizing the Right of Return for Armenians from Artsakh
The agreement makes no reference to implementing the right of return for the Armenians of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). This omission is particularly glaring given that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on November 17, 2023, and a number of international organizations—including organs of the UN, the European Union, the Council of Europe—and various states, at both the executive and legislative levels, have adopted resolutions or decisions emphasizing the mandatory realization of this right.
b. Unconditional Release of Armenian Prisoners of War and Detainees, and Withdrawal of Azerbaijani Forces from Occupied Territory
By treating these issues as “resolved” without the text’s own substantive provisions, the agreement threatens stability and institutionalizes coercive resolution of disputes. Although the text borrows language from the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, and the Helsinki Final Act (which affirm self-determination), it entirely disregards these rights in the case of the Armenians of Artsakh. Moreover, Azerbaijan has detained elected and civil leaders of Artsakh under politically charged and contrived prosecutions, presenting their acts as “proof” of Armenia’s alleged “military aggression.”
c. Lack of a Concrete Legal Basis for Delimitation / Demarcation of the Border
The agreement does not reference specific documents or maps that could, in an indisputable manner, underpin the delimitation and demarcation of the Armenia–Azerbaijan interstate boundary. Armenia had once proposed certain maps as the basis for delimitation, but those were rejected by Azerbaijan. In their absence, Azerbaijan could at any moment torpedo the negotiation process with new or contrived territorial claims—choosing maps favorable to its interests. This risk is especially acute when enclave territories or the presence of Azerbaijani troops on sovereign Armenian land are factored in.
2. The “Alma Ata” Issue
The agreement’s preamble references the Alma Ata Declaration of 1991. However, the declaration is not legally binding; it merely reaffirmed that the dissolution of the USSR would be governed by existing treaties, including the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 21, 1991. The invocation of Alma Ata here seems designed to justify equating the old Soviet administrative boundaries with the post-Soviet international borders of the successor states, including Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In fact:
- The Alma Ata Declaration by itself did not impose any binding international legal obligations on Armenia with respect to Azerbaijan.
- The obligations of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, as stated in the December 8, 1991 CIS Treaty and the Alma Ata Declaration, do not address the determination or mutual recognition of actual state boundaries. In other words, they do not define a method or outcome for demarcating interstate borders among CIS member states.
- Formal mutual recognition of borders among CIS states occurred only on January 22, 1993, when a CIS Charter was adopted—at that time, Azerbaijan was not yet a party to it.
- Armenia ratified the CIS founding treaty on February 18, 1992, but with explicit reservations. As early as December 26, 1991, the Armenian Supreme Council, when ratifying the CIS founding accord, declared its intent to make reservations. In the February 18, 1992 ratification decision, point 10 explicitly recognized the Republic of Artsakh as an independent entity with the right to join the CIS. From that moment, Armenia has never accepted the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. This position was reaffirmed by the July 8, 1992 decision of the Armenian Supreme Council and enshrined in Armenia’s 1995 Constitution.
Furthermore, the 1991 proclamation of independence by Artsakh was based on legal principles established within Soviet legal frameworks, which granted its inhabitants the right of self-determination.
3. The Agreement Omits Its Implementation, Monitoring, and Guarantees
The text lacks an independent oversight or monitoring mechanism. Monitoring is delegated to a bilateral commission, which is unworkable under prevailing conditions of distrust. No sanctions or remedies are proposed for violations. In effect, Azerbaijan gains:
- Official recognition of its Soviet-era borders,
- Closure of all pending legal disputes,
- Relief from international legal pressure,
—without offering any concessions on prisoners, displaced persons, or minority protection. This turns unilateral coercion into the de facto method of resolving disputes.
4. The Agreement Limits International Law via the Provision for Withdrawal of Legal Claims
According to Article XV, the parties commit, within one month after ratification, to withdraw all interstate legal claims. This would close access to the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the European Court of Human Rights, or arbitration for claims related to events of 2020–2023. In practical terms, it absolves Azerbaijan from accountability for aggression, incursions, or forced displacement.
Armenia purportedly yielded this concession under duress in early 2025—amid renewed threats of force, including engineered border incidents and joint military exercises near Armenian borders with Turkey and Pakistan. Under these conditions, Armenia acceded to Azerbaijani demands.
5. The Armenian Authorities Lack Legitimate Authority to Enter Into This Agreement
The current Armenian authorities, based on the five-year government program approved by the National Assembly in 2021, had adopted entirely different parameters regarding the Karabakh issue—and their actions to date run diametrically opposed to those parameters. Therefore, they have never been elected or empowered by the people to enter into a peace process defined by such concessions and compromises. The process thus lacks legitimacy.
6. The Agreement Attempts to Interfere in Armenia’s Internal Affairs
Article VII subtly targets the presence of an EU monitoring mission in Armenia—a mission that Azerbaijan has repeatedly opposed and threatened. Yerevan had previously proposed limiting EU monitors to border segments and treating their deployment elsewhere as a deterrent measure. This article is in effect interference in Armenia’s domestic affairs, particularly concerning the country’s sovereign ability to enhance its defense capabilities.
Moreover, internal contradictions exist between Article IV (non-interference) and Article VIII (the obligation to fight separatism, extremism, terrorism). These politically charged formulations allow each side to evaluate the other’s domestic policies, violating the principle of non-interference and sowing grounds for future tension.
In sum, because the memorandum and pre-agreement signed on August 8 leave many essential questions unresolved and open to interpretation, Azerbaijan retains the capacity to suspend or derail the process unilaterally—and to extract further concessions from Armenia.
On the same day, Armenia further agreed, by another memorandum, to the provision of “unimpeded” overland connectivity — a commitment that risks undermining Armenia’s sovereign integrity and territorial authority. We plan to dedicate a future article to a detailed analysis of that clause of the agreement. In a subsequent installment, we will also examine the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group and the absence of any alternative international forum to deliberate lingering issues in a climate of mutual trust.
Click here for part 1.
